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Film Policy, the Chinese Government and Soft Power 
Yanling Yang 
Abstract 
This article examines how the Chinese ruling party understands the role of film and how film 
policy has been used to promote &KLQD¶VVRIWSRZHU,WILUVWO\explores shifts in policy over a 
period of 60 years in order to LGHQWLI\WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VRYHUDOODSSURDFKWRWKHfilm industry. 
Then it investigates µ=RX&KX4X¶ Policy, the so-FDOOHGµ*RLQJ-2XW3ROLF\¶, specifically aimed 
at promoting soft power. This article argues that although the role of the film industry has been 
adjusted in response to developments in Chinese society, the principle function of film as a tool 
of propaganda, along with the broader censorship system, have not fundamentally changed. 
Such policy arrangements have resulted in a tension EHWZHHQWKHµDWWUDFWLRQ¶RIVRIWSRZHUDQG
WKHVWDWH¶VDWWUDFWLRQWRcensorship. Consequently, there currently seems little room for Chinese 
films to contribute to &KLQD¶VVRIWSRZHUin any meaningful way.    
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Introduction: the significance of soft power to China 
Joseph Nye (2004: ix) coined the term µsoft power¶ to describe µthe ability to get what you want 
through attraction rather than coercion or payments¶. Specifically, he points to three primary 
sources of soft power: culture, political values and foreign policy (2004: 11). By contrast, 
military, economic, and technological strength are defined as sources of hard power (2004: 2±
11). Nye further indicates that soft power relies on credibility, which means that if information 
is suspected to be  propaganda, its credibility, along with its potential to generate soft power 
influence, is lost (Nye 2011: 83). The concept of soft power has gained widespread visibility 
in the last decade, both amongst academics and national political elites. Rawnsley, for example, 
observes that China has embraced the idea of soft power with an overwhelming enthusiasm 
(Rawnsley 2012).Soft power is important to China for two main reasons: firstly it is considered 
to mitigate the so-FDOOHGµ&KLQDWKUHDWWKHRU\¶DQGFUHDWHDIULHQGOLHULQWHUQDWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQW 
more FRQGXFLYHWRWKHFRXQWU\¶VGHYHORSPHQWsecondly, it is considered to be an asset in the 
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maintenance of WKH3DUW\¶V national power and thus a support to domestic stability (Blanchard 
and Lu 2012, Li 2008).  
 
On the international front, soft power is considered to be important to WKHVWDWH¶Vattempts to 
µrefute the China threat theory¶ and to maintain a stable and peaceful international environment 
IRU&KLQD¶VGHYHORSPHQW (Li 2008: 300). During the past two decades, the rapid growth of 
&KLQD¶V PLOLWDU\ HFRQRPLF DQG SROLWLFDO SRZHU KDV H[DFHUEDWHG WHQVLRQV LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
SROLWLFV0DQ\LQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQVDQDO\VWVEHOLHYHWKDW&KLQD¶VULVHPD\GLVUXSWWKHEDODQFH
of power in the current global geopolitical landscape, challenging the US in particular 
(Kurlantzick 2007). For example, political scientist John Mearsheimer argued in his book The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (1998) that there was great potential for war by 2020, with 
China emerging as a key destabilising force. Moreover, scholars have argued that Chinese 
leaders are under extreme pressure to deal with many internal social issues which might harm 
the ruling position of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and disrupt domestic stability. 
These include the extreme inequalities in wealth and environmental destruction related to 
&KLQD¶VUDSLGLQGXVWULDOdevelopment (Hunter 2009: 381). The idea of soft power thus emerged 
at the right time to provide Chinese ruling elites with an umbrella concept, µa convenient set of 
claims and prescriptions¶, which the government felt could be instrumentalised strategically to 
ease fears abroad concerning its rise, as well as to maintain social stability in China (Hayden 
2011: 169). Chinese leaders, including former President Hu Jintao and his successor Xin 
Jinping, have put a good deal of emphasis on the role to be played by VRIWSRZHULQ&KLQD¶V
statecraft.  
 
With the rapid growth of the Chinese film industry and the prestigious international awards 
that Chinese films have won at international festivals during the past decade, the Beijing 
authorities consider cinema to have JUHDWSRWHQWLDO WRSURPRWH&KLQD¶VVRIWSRZHURYHUVHDV
Table 1 shows the astonishing development of the Chinese film industry from 2001 to 2015. It 
LV ZRUWK QRWLQJ WKDW LQ  WKH &KLQHVH ILOP LQGXVWU\ EHFDPH WKH ZRUOG¶V VHFRQG ODUJHVW
market, worth 21.7 billion China Renminbi (CNY), approximately 3.3 billion US Dollars 
(USD) in box-office revenue, accounting for 10% of the global film market (MPA and CFCP 
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2014).1 More interestingly, Chinese cinema is expected to overtake North America to become 
the prime market for films in 2017 (Pulver 2015). 
 
Year Number of 
feature films 
Box office 
(billion 
USD) 
Number of 
cinemas 
Number of 
screens 
2001 88 0.13 - - 
2002 100 0.15 875 1581 
2003 140 0.14 1108 2296 
2004 212 0.23 1188 2396 
2005 260 0.31 1243 2668 
2006 330 0.40 1325 3034 
2007 402 0.51 1427 3527 
2008 406 0.67 1545 4097 
2009 456 0.95 1687 4723 
2010 526 1.56 2000 6256 
2011 558 1.95 2803 9286 
2012 745 2.62 3000 13118 
2013 638 3.34 3903 18196 
2014 618 4.56 4409 23600 
2015 686 6.76 8027 31627 
 
Table 1: Overview of the Chinese film industry, 2001-2015.  
Compiled by the author from various sources: 2001-2013: Film Bureau (MPA and CFCP 
2014: 43); 2014: China.net (2015); 2015: Variety (2016). 
 
In order to understand how the Chinese government seeks to employ film to generate soft 
power, it is necessary to explore the interaction between the government and the film industry 
in general (Johnson 1996: 134-35). The four-fold typology of patronage of culture proposed by 
                                                          
1 Box office data is provided in USD for analytical and comparative purpose. Chinese local currency box office 
trends may differ due to exchange rate fluctuations. According to Bloomberg, the 52-week exchange rate of 
USD to CNY varied from 6.2083 to 6.7047. Therefore, this research adopts 6.5 as the average exchange rate 
between USD and CNY (http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/USDCNY:CUR) [Accessed 10 March 
2016]. 
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Chartrand and McCaughey (1989 cited in Bell and Oakley 2015: 116) is very useful in this 
respect.  
 
 
Table 2: Models of national support for the arts. Source: Bell & Oakley (2015:116)  
 
As Table 2 shows, there are a variety of roles available to governments in relation to their 
cultural industry and these can be grouped into four categories. Firstly, the US is a typical 
H[DPSOH RI D µ)DFLOLWDWRU 6tate¶ WKDW XVHV incentives such as tax exemption rather than 
prescriptive regulation; secondly, the UK represents a µ3atron State¶ in its role of µdevolving 
cultural policy implementation to so-FDOOHG DUP¶V±length bodies¶; thirdly, the French 
government acts as an µArchitect State¶ WKDW DLPV to improve its social welfare by using 
bureaucracy as a regulatory agency; and fourthly, aiming at µpolitical education¶, the former 
Soviet Union RSHUDWHGDVDQµ(QJLQHHU6tate¶ in charge of µthe means of artistic production¶ 
with the state interfering directly in content production (Bell and Oakley 2015: 116). 
Meanwhile, based on the assertion that censorship is the most noticeable symbol of an 
µEngineer¶ type of state, China is assumed to follow in the footsteps of the former Soviet Union, 
in that it operates a strict censorship system in governing its cultural production in general and 
films in particular. The transformation and development of the Chinese film industry can be 
divided into three distinct periods: 1. the era of nationalisation (1949-1976) when the film 
industry was nationalised and subsidised by the state; 2. the era of reform (1977-2000) which 
saw the decentralisation and opening up to the film industry to the market; and finally 3. the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) era (2001 onwards) when the film industry underwent major 
reforms and expansion (Yin 2009). Since censorship can be regarded as the most representative 
                                                          
2$UP·V-length refers to keeping a degree of distance between government and artists: ¶The British government 
(and other fellow users) is able to distance itself from thorny decision-making, while the cultural sector is to 
some extent insulated from government meddling (allegedly, at least)· (Bell and Oakley 2015: 123). 
6WDWH¶VUROH Model country Policy objective Funding system 
Facilitator  US Diversity Tax exemption 
Patron  UK Excellence $UP¶V-length2 arts councils 
Architect France Social welfare Ministry of Culture 
Engineer Soviet Union Political 
education 
Ownership of means of 
artistic production 
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factor of an µEngineer State¶, the function of film and the WUDQVIRUPDWLRQRI&KLQD¶VFHQVRUVKLS
mechanisms will be discussed further here. Moreover, I will investigate the results of &KLQD¶V
film policy, focussing in particular on its outputs and its so-FDOOHGµH[WHUQDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶ 
(Duiwai Jiaoliu), or how the industry communicates with the rest of the world, a particular 
emphasis in recent policy interventions, defined DV&KLQD¶Vµ*RLQJ-Out 3ROLF\¶. I will look at 
how this has changed during key periods in the &KLQHVHILOPLQGXVWU\¶VGHYHORSPHQW   
The era of nationalisation 1949-1976: film at the service of politics 
 
Analyses of the period spanning the foundation of the 3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRIChina (PRC) in 
WRWKHHQGRI&KLQD¶V&XOWXUDO5HYROXWLRQLQKDYHevidenced in great detail how film 
was used straightforwardly as a political tool by the Communist Party (Clark 1987). Film was 
considered by the Party as a tool for mass education, in a similar fashion to the way it was 
understood in the Soviet Union at that time (Zhang 2004). The relationship between the state 
and the film industry was consolidated by means of the centralisation of film production, 
distribution and exhibition, and the provision of state subsidies. This organisational structure 
remained intact for nearly three decades because of the stability of the µsame basic institutional 
and discursive paradigm¶ LQWHUPVRIWKHVWDWH¶VJRYHUQDQFH(Berry 2004: 27-8). Under these 
circumstances, Chinese film policy sought µto present a work of art only as an illustration of a 
current political slogan, and only as propaganda for 0DR¶VLQVWUXFWLRQDQGVORJDQs¶ (cited in 
Chen 1994: 27).  
 
Censorship and the film licensing system were also established during this period. In the 1950s, 
all films had to be approved by the appropriate authority before they could be shown to 
audiences (Berry 2004: 31, Hu and Yao 1989: 11-3). General guidelines concerning which 
types of films would be banned were also provided as follows: 1. those which were deemed to 
be anti-Communist, anti-Soviet, and anti-human rights; 2. films that were considered to 
propagate imperialism (including racism) and feudalism; 3. films that had pornographic content 
or any films that were deemed to contravene any of WKHVWDWH¶Vlaws or policies (Hu and Yao 
1989: 12). At the same time, the film licensing system was introduced by the Film Guidance 
Committee in order to µstrength[en] the centralised system by setting up specific ideological 
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and artistic standards for films [by] examining completed films and distribution figures¶ (Clark 
1987: 35).  
         
Although general guidelines were provided on the types of films that were considered 
inappropriate, there were no clear set of standards. Both the censorship and licensing regulation 
systems were too abstract to be followed entirely consistently and there were µso many leaders 
and so much examination along the way¶ (Clark 1987: 44) that, as a result, a huge space was 
left for political intervention. For example, twelve films were banned in 1951. The first film of 
these, The Life of Wuxun (1951), is a typical case of the µabsolute supremacy of politics over 
art¶ in Chinese cinema history at the time (Zhang 2004: 198). The film is about a beggar, named 
Wuxun, who sets up free schools for poor children during the Qing dynasty. At the time of its 
release it won critical and popular acclaim, but after Chairman Mao criticised it openly for 
µinsanely promoting feudal culture [and] misrepresenting Chinese culture¶, the film was banned 
nationally (Zhang 2004: 198). 
 
 
Figure 1: The life of Wuxun (Yu 1951) 
Source: [Accessed 10 March 2015] image available from https://www.google.co.uk/search?q 
 
The film licensing system was based on command from above and responded to government 
orders rather than market demands (Berry 2004: 9). This had a serious impact on the domestic 
industry. Figure 2 shows that the number of films made during this period grew from just 10 
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in 1949 to 101 in 1959. Then, in the space of less than a decade this figure had decreased to 
just 12. At the start of the Cultural Revolution, in the period from 1966 to 1969, no films were 
produced, and numbers were still low in the early 1970s. The film industry started to recover 
by the end of Cultural Revolution, producing 37 films in 1976.  
 
 
Figure 2: Chinese feature film production: 1949-1976 (Clark 1987) 
 
In terms of film promotion overseas, during the period 1950 to 1976, the focus was on cultural 
exchange, using Chinese propaganda films to introduce the newly established PRC to other 
socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites  (Yang et al. 
2009). Thus, the propaganda film The White Haired Girl (1950) was widely promoted abroad 
by the government. Its main theme was to praise the good life within the new society under the 
rule of the CPC, while criticising the previous Kuomintang regime. 
 
 
Figure 3: The White-Haired Girl (Khoua and Wang 1950). Source: [Accessed 10 March 2015] 
image available from http://cn.hujiang.com/new/p538464/ 
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By the end of 1965, China had set up extensive overseas contacts in the film sector with about 
90 countries. State institutions were the only organs permitted to distribute films abroad and 
their main initiatives consisted principally of attending international film festivals and holding 
Chinese Film Weeks overseas (Huang and Hu 2012: 23-6). However, these external 
communication channels were seriously affected by the start of the Cultural Revolution in 
1966. As Figure 2 shows above, not a single film was made from 1967 to 1969, nor was any 
film made before 1966 permitted to be shown overseas during the Cultural Revolution period. 
This time was called the µfrozen period¶ as the external communication channels that China 
had built up with the world before the Cultural Revolution, in which film had played an 
important role, were almost completely shut down at this time (Huang and Hu 2012: 26).  
 
The era of reform and opening up 1977-2000 
 
Looking at the period from WKHHQGRI&KLQD¶V&XOWXUDO5HYROXWLRQ until 2000, when China 
joined the WTO, the µeconomic mechanism reform¶the country underwent during this period 
KDGDGHHSLPSDFWRQWKHILOPLQGXVWU\)LOP¶VUROHDVDSURSDJDQGDWRROthat could represent 
the class struggle was abandoned (Chen 1994: 95). In order to accede to the viewing tastes of 
the people and the market, a variety of film genres began to be supported in addition to more 
traditional propaganda films. Here we might mention, for instance, the popular entertainment 
film The Dream Factory (Feng Xiaogang, 1997), which was shown all over the country. 
According to Tang, popular films of this kind accounted for 70% of market share during this 
period (Tang 2008: 161).  
 
However, this greater diversity of film production, along with a new aspiration to make films 
that were profitable, did not eliminate political propaganda and the ideological function of 
Chinese film for the government. During this period, so-called µMain Melody¶ films were the 
&3&¶V SUHGRPLQDQW mechanism of ideological control, their µpatriotism, collectivism and 
socialism¶ (China Film Yearbook 1994: 13) focusing largely on praising the glorious history 
and leadership of the CPC. The guideline entitled µSuggestion on Current Prosperous Literary 
and Artistic Creation¶ in 1991, stipulated that the Chinese government should take 
responsibility for supporting and subsidising Main-Melody films (Chu 2010: 105±107). The 
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Party State put great effort into designing particular policies, granting state-level awards and 
offering exclusive funding to support this cinematic genre. As the Chinese government invested 
heavily in promoting this particular genre of films, one can consider these activities as a form 
of µsoft censorship¶ (Bell and Oakley 2015: 126) rather than hard or direct censorship. Zhao 
has argued that the µVWDWH¶VPRUHDJJUHVVLYHVWUDWHJ\WRHOHYDWHWKHVWDWXVRIWKHFXOWXUHLQGXVWU\
is an attempt to dissolve the political dimension of the media into the less politicised area of 
FXOWXUH DQG IXUWKHU WR GHILQH WKH SDUW\¶V SROLWLFDO LQWHUHVW DV WKH SXEOLF LQWHUHVW¶ (Zhao 
2008: 109-10). Life after the Departure of Leifeng (1996) is an example of Main-Melody film. 
Produced by a state-owned enterprise (SOE), the film tells the story of how the selfless spirit 
of Leifeng, a national hero who although dead could still inspire his friend to change his life.   
 
 
Figure 4: Life after Departure of Leifeng (Lei and Kang 1996) 
Source: [Accessed 20 August 2015] available from https://www.google.co.uk/search?q 
 
The regime still regarded film as a useful ideological tool for educating the masses. In order to 
maintain its legitimacy, the CPC made tremendous efforts to strike a balance between 
IDFLOLWDWLQJWKHILOPLQGXVWU\¶VGHYHORSPHQWDQGUHSDFNDJLQJLWVRZQSURSDJDQGDDSSDUDWXV,Q
1996, the first set of µ5HJXODWLRQV on the Administration of Films¶ stipulated that µChina shall 
adopt a censorship system; film may not be produced, distributed, exhibited, imported nor 
exported without examination and approval by the Film Administration Institution of China¶. 
In addition, film studios were required to register with this institution in order to gain a 
production license. However, these legal provisions were too abstract to be effectively 
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implemented. Since there was no explicit consensus about regulating the content of films, other 
than that everything had to be approved by the Film Administration, those in the film industry 
were often unclear about what was actually permitted or forbidden. Therefore, many films were 
banned by the Chinese authorities without any clear explanation for their decisions, including 
To Live (1994, dir. Zhang Yimou) and Blue Kite (Tian Zhuangzhuang, 1993). Even though the 
film Farewell My Concubine (Chen Kaige, 1993) gained awards at many prestigious 
international festivals, such as the Golden Globes in the US and the Cannes Film Festival in 
France, it was still banned because it touched upon themes of homosexuality and the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution.  
 
Figure 5: Farewell My Concubine (Chen 1993) 
Source: [Accessed 10 March 2016] image available from https://www.google.co.uk/search?q 
 
In response to radical changes in the political, cultural and economic sectors, the film industry 
underwent comprehensive reform during this period, including the de-nationalision of film 
production, distribution and exhibition. This led to economic reform and an overall opening up 
of the industry. The most fundamental change was that, for the first time, non-SOEs were 
permitted to participate in the film market. The Chinese government urged non-state actors, 
such as private enterprises, social institutions, even individuals, to invest in film production. 
Another fundamental change was that the state re-opened the film market to foreign financial 
investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan, which had both been banned from participating in 
the Chinese market for over three decades. As Figure 6 shows, during this period, the Chinese 
film industry considerably increased its output. At the start of this period in 1977, just 19 films 
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were produced. This rose dramatically, peaking at 170 in 1992. According to some film experts, 
LWZDV&KLQD¶VUHIRUPWKDWOHGWRWKHJURZWKRIWKHQDWLRQDOILOPLQGXVWU\DQGthe promotion of 
Chinese film overseas (Yang et al. 2009: 12). 
 
 
Figure 6: Feature film production 1977 to 2000 (Yin and Wang 2004, Clark 1987: 185) 
 
Regarding film promotion, as Table 3 shows, impressive improvements were made to the 
promotion of Chinese films abroad particularly in the early part of this period. In 1981, for 
example, Chinese films were exhibited 682 times in 34 nations and regions.  
Year Nations  & regions Number of films exhibited 
1981 34 682 
1982 53 541 
1983 62 364 
1984 52 457 
1985 41 395 
1986 74 393 
1987 / 533 
1988 41 512 
1989 34 350 
1990 / 299 
1991 / 412 
1992 45 206 
1993 16 121 
1998 / 170 
Table 3: Chinese film exhibition abroad since 1980s (He 2012: 107-10). 
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This era marked a transformational period for Chinese film in the international sphere. Apart 
from propaganda films, new types of Chinese films emerged on the international stage. The so-
called µfifth generation¶ of Chinese directors started to attend international film festivals and 
win awards, not only energising the Chinese film industry, but also alerting the world to a new 
wave of Chinese cinema. The fifth-generation descriptor is mainly used to refer to the first 
Post-Cultural Revolution graduates from the Beijing Film Academy in the early 1980s. Unlike 
the propaganda-style Chinese films of the earlier period, the aesthetic and political stance of 
films such as  Yellow Earth (Chen Kaige, 1984) and Red Sorghum (Zhang Yimou, 1987), were 
considered internationally to be µinnovative, introspective and retrospective, often digging deep 
into Chinese culture and human nature¶ as it had been shaped by an extraordinary period of 
social change (Jeff 2016).  
 
The WTO period 2001 to present day: the strategic function of film  
:LWK&KLQD¶VHQWU\LQWRWKH:72LQLPSRUWDQWFKDQJHVRFFXUUHGLQWKHFRXQWU\WKDWKDG
a profound impact on the film industry. On the one hand, the state acknowledged the important 
strategic function of the cultural industries in statecraft, and declared it would invest in these 
in order to strengthen its national power. It was during this era that discussion around the 
concept of soft power emerged. In terms of the film industry, further decentralization of film 
production, distribution, and exhibition followed. This included inviting private and 
transnational investment, and by 2013 China had developed into the second biggest film market 
in terms of box office. On the other hand, and contrary to views that China was now 
fundamentally market-driven (Zhu 2002), although the CPC accepted the commoditised nature 
of film, it still continued to operate a sophisticated system of regulation and censorship in order 
to reinforce its overall control of the film industry. 
 
,QWKHUHSRUWRIWKH3DUW\¶Vth National Congress in October 2002, the CPC acknowledged the 
strategic significance of the cultural industry and indicated the need to develop this in order to 
enhance overall national strength. Thus it was clear that the Party considered culture to be a 
key national strength, as important as its hard power resources (its economic might, military 
power etc.). However, this change in policy at the time, a change that is still in effect today, 
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did not mean that the state was ignoring the role that film can play in political ideology. 
President Hu Jintao emphasised that µDOOWKRVHZRUNLQJZLWK&KLQD¶VILOPLQGXVWU\VKRXOGVWLFN
to the correct political direction all the time, and keep their sense of social responsibility to 
IXUWKHU WKH SURVSHULW\ RI &KLQD¶V ILOP LQGXVWU\¶ (The Independent 2006). Therefore, the 
argument posited by some scholars that the Chinese film industry  has been µcompletely 
transformed from a state-owned industry to a market-driven entity¶ or that the µstate has 
withdrawn its ideological control from film production¶ seems doubtful (Zhu 2002). 
 
The CPC continued to use the censorship and licensing system to impose comprehensive 
regulation on the film industry, initially through its executive branch the State Administration 
of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), and now through its successor organisation the State 
Administration of Press, Publishing, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT). The aim of these 
organisations was, and is, to ensure that µpolitically correct films are made and distributed¶ 
(Rosen 2002: 96). Meanwhile, the licensing system guarantees state intervention in film 
production, distribution and exhibition. SARFT has the right to prohibit any production not 
having prior approval, and every single film must pass through censorship before obtaining a 
distribution license. For example, although it won a Silver Bear Award at the Berlin Film 
Festival, the Chinese film Beijing Bicycle (Wang Xiaoshuai 2001) was banned in mainland 
China. This was not because it deals with any sensitive content but because it did not wait to 
UHFHLYHWKH&KLQHVHDXWKRULW\¶VDSSURval before attending film festivals.  
 
Figure 7: Beijing Bicycle (Wang 2001) 
Source: [Accessed 8 January 2016] image available from 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0276501/mediaviewer/rm3265371136 
14 
 
 
The film authorities have not given up using cinema to propagate political ideology but have 
adjusted their strategy in relation to the political use of film. Here one might mention, for 
example, the state-funded film The Founding of a Republic (Han Sanping and Huang Jianxin 
2009), which was made to coincide with the 60th anniversary of the CPC founding of China. 
Some of &KLQD¶V most famous film stars, including Jackie Chan, Jet Li and Zhang Ziyi, were 
cast in the roles of the CPC founders to ensure box-office appeal and figures suggest this tactic 
was very successful. Xin Hua News Agency viewed it as a successful example of the Main-
Melody genre: µthis film achieved widespread attention and a spread propaganda message 
HIIHFWLYHO\ >«@ D very successful combination of political propaganda and box office 
performance¶ (Xinhuanet 2009).  
 
Figure 8: The Founding of a Republic  (Han and Huang 2009) 
Source: [Accessed 18 March 2015] image available from https://www.google.co.uk/search?q 
 
The Chinese film industry has made remarkable breakthroughs since 2000. The regime has 
issued a range of regulations intended to encourage non-state actors to engage in the 
development of the film industry across the value chain of production, distribution and 
exhibition. From the production perspective, the most important change was the release of the 
µInterim Provisions on Operation Qualification Access for Movie Enterprises¶ (Known as 
Document No. 43) which was issued by SARFT in 2004. Following the release of this 
document, international investors were granted permission to invest in the Chinese film 
production sector, although their ownership was limited to less than 49%.  
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While the above measure encouraged non-state actors to contribute to the development of the 
Chinese film industry, at the same time SOEs continued to enjoy privileges in certain areas. 
For example, although the state council issued guidance in 2010 on the promotion of wealth-
creation and the development of the film industry to encourage non-state actors to invest in the 
film industry, treating non-state actors on equal terms with state actors, state actors still receive 
many more benefits, further HYLGHQFH RI &KLQD¶V µsoft censorship¶. In the case of film 
distribution, for example, only two SOEs, Huaxia Distribution Co., Ltd. (henceforth Huaxia) 
and the China Film Group Co., Ltd. (henceforth China Film) are eligible to make large profits 
by importing foreign films (mainly Hollywood blockbuster films) to China. Neither Hollywood 
film studios nor private or international participators are allowed to challenge this privilege. 
As a result, there is still no competition in the field of distributing foreign films into the Chinese 
market. 
 
Once China became a member of the WTO in 2001, Chinese film production increased more-
or-less steadily year-on-year. Figure 9 shows the stunning growth of Chinese feature film 
production over the period from 2001 to 2015. 
 
 
Figure 9: Feature film production from 2001 to 2015. 
Source: 2001-2013 (Yin 2013), 2014: China.net (2015); 2015: Variety (2016) 
 
Such a remarkable growth in film production and international market share brought 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO DWWHQWLRQ WR &KLQD¶V ILOP industry. It is predicted to become the biggest film 
market by 2020 (Pulver 2015). The Chinese government has begun making great efforts to 
encourage Chinese film distribution overseas. In 2009, the µPlan for Promotion of the Cultural 
Industries¶ was issued$VWKLVZDVWKHILUVWVSHFLILFSODQWDUJHWLQJ&KLQD¶VFXOWXUDOLQGXVWULHV
LWLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKHVHZHUHVHHQDVEHLQJRIVWUDWHJLFLPSRUWDQFHIRUPLQJDFRUHSDUWRI&KLQD¶V
88 100
140
212
260 330
402 406
456 526
558
745
638 618
686
0
200
400
600
800
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
16 
 
soft power strategy, the state now starting to encourage the promotion of Chinese culture on 
the international stage. Subsequent to this, in 2010, the State Council issued µGuidelines on 
Facilitating the Development of the Film Industry.¶ This calls for the active promotion of 
Chinese film abroad, and the enhancement of national cultural soft power. This reflects the 
VWDWH¶VLQWHQWLRQWRHVWDEOLVKDPRUHGHWDLOHGPHFKDQLVPIRUHQFRXUDJLQJDQGVXSSRUWLQJWKH
dissemination of Chinese film abroad. It is at this point that &KLQD¶VµGoing-Out Policy¶ begins 
to emerge. 
 
However, in comparison with the rapid growth of Chinese film in the domestic market, the 
number of films exhibited overseas has increased relatively slowly, as Table 4 shows. Prior to 
2006, less than 400 Chinese films were exhibited abroad; this then rose to over 450 annually, 
reaching a peak in 2013 when Chinese films were exhibited 951 times in 48 nations and 
regions. 
Year Nations & regions The number of film exhibited 
2001 12 About 100 
2002 16 More than 110 
2003 15 110 
2004 27 More than 240 
2005 25 218 
2006 38 480 
2007 26 605 
2008 29 474 
2009 47 647 
2010 35 578 
2011 44 485 
2012 40 576 
2013 48 951 
2014 44 452 
 
Table 4: Annual Chinese film exhibitions overseas, 2001-2014 (Calendar year from January 
1to December 31). 
Compiled by the author from different sources: 2001-2007 (Luan 2008); 2008-2010 (Liu 
2010); 2011-2014 (Huang and Hu 2012: 240, Huang and Huang 2013: 323, Huang and Yang 
2014: 219, 2015: 200) 
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Based on all of the above, it is clear that the Chinese government has played a significant role 
in leading the transformation of the film industry over the past six decades, gradually opening 
up the film market and adjusting film policies according to the prevailing circumstances. 
However, the centralised political system, the perception that culture is an ideological tool, and 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V top-down approach to policy has not fundamentally changed (Shan 2014). 
The principal function of film continues to be that of ideological tool, and this has impacted on 
the ways in which film can be XVHGWRSURMHFW&KLQD¶VVRIWSRZHU 
 
The µGoing-Out 3ROLF\¶DQG &KLQD¶Vsoft power 
 
We now turn to a detailed analysis of µ=RX&KX4X¶, &KLQD¶VVR-FDOOHGµ*RLQJ-Out Policy¶. 
Here I argue that &KLQD¶Vdecision makers have deployed film to spread &KLQD¶VFXOWXUDOVRIW
power. The µGoing-Out Policy¶ is in line with WKHKLVWRULFDOWUDMHFWRU\RI&KLQD¶Vfilm policy, 
in that it is fully controlled by the government and retains ILOP¶V political propaganda function. 
The µGoing-Out 3ROLF\¶ ZDV proposed by the Chinese President Jiang Zemin (1993-2003) 
during the reform period discussed above. He argued that Chinese enterprises should venture 
abroad and later developed a strategy that was intended to µexpand exports, go out further to 
do business and increase foreign exchange earnings¶ (Chen 2008). The µGoing-Out Policy¶ was 
then further emphasised in the 11th (2006-2010) and 12th Five-Year Plans (2011-2015) as an 
important way to µimprove the image of China abroad and build up its soft power; to present 
and disseminate Chinese culture around the world¶.  
 
The government has played a strategic and leading role in developing and implementing 
&KLQD¶VµGoing-Out 3ROLF\¶. In the case of the film industry, this process commenced in 2001 
with the promulgation of µImplementation Rules for the Going-Out Project (Trial)¶ by SARFT. 
This document stated that the primary objective of film µgoing out¶ was to µGLVVHPLQDWH&KLQD¶V
voice to the world, especially North America and West European, to show the real China, and 
&KLQD¶VDWWLWXGHYLHZVDQGRSLQLRQVRQNH\LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVVXHV¶ (SARFT 2001).  
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The new version of µRegulations on the Administration of Films¶ was issued and expanded to 
13 articles in 2001 as compared with the 8 articles of the 1996 version. Both sets of regulations 
forbade the production, distribution and exhibition of films without official permission and in 
case of contravention of these regulations, the administrative institutes would µimpose a fine 
on a film production entity and revoke its license and even resort to pressing criminal charges¶ 
(Chu 2010: 116).The new version listed more specific details. For example, it listed that the 
penalty for anyone who showed a Chinese production abroad without permission: µany entity 
or individual whose license has been revoked is forbidden from engaging in any film activities, 
such as film production, importation, exporting, distributing and projection for five years¶ (Chu 
2010: 116).  
 
Additionally, the government issued a series of policies calling for Chinese film WRµJRing-RXW¶, 
or actively seek foreign distribution. In subsequent years, the Chinese government issued 
several more regulations. These marked the intention to establish a more direct implementation 
system of governance over the µGoing-Out Policy¶ than had existed hitherto (Shambaugh 
2013: 174-75). For example, in April 2011, the Ministry of Culture also enacted µThe General 
Plan for the Promotion of Cultural Goods and Services Going-Out 2011-2015¶. In October 
2011, the Sixth Plenary session of the Communist Party Congress passed the µResolution of 
the CPC Central Committee on Major Issues Pertaining to Deepening the Reform of the 
Cultural System and Promoting the Great Development and Flourishing of Socialist Culture¶. 
These documents HPSKDVLVHG WKH QHHG WR DFFHOHUDWH WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI &KLQD¶V FXOWXUDO
industry and encouraged cultural institutions to expand overseas (CPC Central Committee 
2011). 
 
With all these officially sanctioned µGoing-2XW¶ statements, it is clear that the Chinese 
authorities believed in the potential for film to play a major role in supporting this policy and 
RI FRQVHTXHQWO\ IRU ILOP WR VXSSRUW WKH VWDWH¶V HIIRUWV WR JHQHUDWH DQG SURMHFW soft power. 
Already in the document µImplementation Rules of the Going-Out Project (Trial)¶ issued by 
SARFT in 2001, Article 3 introduces four channels by which Chinese film was to be distributed 
overseas: 1. by holding Chinese film exhibitions or festivals; 2. by attending international film 
festivals; 3. by strengthening co-production connections and 4. by inviting world-famous 
19 
 
producers to visit China. Meanwhile, the regulation also emphasised that all those working 
ZLWKLQ&KLQD¶VILOPLQGXVWU\VKRXOGPDLQWDLQWKHFRUUHFWSROLWLFDOLGHRORJ\DWDOOWLPHV.  
 
%DVHG RQ WKH WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ RI &KLQD¶V ILOP SROLF\ DQG WKH REMHFWLYHV RI WKH µGoing-Out 
Policy¶, the approaches that have been officially endorsed for Chinese films going overseas 
are: 1. the organisation of Chinese film exhibitions events; 2. participation in film festivals; 3. 
the global export of Chinese film based on encouraging international releases at film theatres, 
on DVD, on TV, and the Internet. These approaches are summarised in Figure 10 below: 
 
 
Figure 10: Officially endorsed approaches to support Chinese film µGoing-Out¶. 
 
It is important to note that these three approaches involve various levels of government 
intervention, assistance and subsidies. All three approaches also imply a consensus among 
Chinese policy makers, international soft power researchers and Chinese film experts that they 
view the global visibility of film on the international stage as the crucial precondition for film 
to be successful in promoting WKHQDWLRQ¶Vsoft power.  
 
The challenge to China in its soft power ambitions for film 
 
China has to face the dilemma created by the tension between its need for censorship, on the 
one hand, and its wish for credibility with international audiences on the other. As an 
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DXWKRULWDULDQUHJLPH&KLQD¶VSROLWLFDOLGHRORJ\LVGLIIHUHQWIURPWKH:HVW¶VSROLWLFDOYDOXHV
The CPC insists on promoting a socialist core value system and controlling the public by means 
of µpropaganda and ideology¶ (Xinhuanet 2013)7KH&3&¶VYLHZWKDWFXOWXUHis essentially an 
ideological tool has not fundamentally changed since the party took power in 1949. As a result, 
WKH 3DUW\¶V rigid political ideology and perception of culture create a dilemma for those 
LQYROYHGLQSURPRWLQJ&KLQD¶VFXOWXUDOVRIWSRZHURYHUVHDVAlthough the Chinese authorities 
increasingly seek to employ cultural instead of political values in its engagement with 
international audiences, this is still hindered by its domestic political ideology.  
 
Leading scholars of VRIWSRZHUKDYHKLJKOLJKWHGWKHLVVXHRI&KLQD¶VSROLWLFDOYDOXHVas the 
PDLQ IDFWRUV WKDW OLPLW &KLQD¶V VRIW SRZHU, citing its µdomestic political censorship¶ (Nye 
2012: 154), its µrepressive political¶ system or the restriction of µfree expression within China 
itself¶ (Shambaugh 2015). The censorship issue clearly creates a negative image that damages 
&KLQD¶VFXOWXUDOVRIWSRZHU=KDQJ<LPRXWKHIDPRXV&KLQHVHGLUHFWRUFRPSODLQVWKDWµfilms 
about contemporary China [are] neutered by the censors¶ (Nye 2012: 154). This is evidenced 
YHU\FOHDUO\LQWKHVWDWH¶VUHFHQWWUHDWPHQWRIWKH film Touch of Sin (Jia Zhangke, 2013). The 
film was adapted from four true incidents involving ordinary people driven to violence by 
social conflicts in contemporary China. Although it won the Best Screenplay Award at the 
Cannes Film Festival and therefore enjoyed high visibility on the international stage, it is still 
yet to be screened in mainland China. Although the authorities have not commented on why 
the film has not been screened, one might surmise that this results from  the fact that this film 
is µa compelling epic about people driven to extremes by the pain of modern life¶(Kermode 
2014). This case, moreover, reveals the lack of transparency with regard to censorship in China. 
The film was simply banned, without any explicit explanation. 
 
Since the CPC has not abandoned its view that film is an ideological tool, a position which it 
feels required the continued employment of a censorship system, it finds it difficult to build 
credibility with foreign audiences, OHDGLQJWRDODFNRIFUHGLELOLW\IRU&KLQD¶VVRIWSRZHURQWKH
international stage (Nye 2015). This is emphasised in international soft power indexes, which 
invariably suggest WKDWSROLWLFDO LVVXHV FRQVWUDLQ&KLQD¶V VRIW SRZHU)RU H[DPSOH WKH ,I*-
Monocle Soft Power Index regards individual freedom and political criticism as two of the 
main factors that impact negatively RQ&KLQD¶VVRIWSRZHUµSoft Power 30¶ UHJDUGV&KLQD¶V
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low ranking in its soft power league table partly to be a result of the kind of censorship outlined 
above (Portland 2016). Nye observes that µgreat powers try to use culture and narrative to create 
soft power that promotes their advantage, but it is not always an easy sell if it is inconsistent 
with their domestic realities¶ (Nye 2012: 155). Or, as Geoff Dyer explains, µthere is no 
international audience for brittle propaganda¶ (Dyer 2010). As a result, the Chinese authorities 
have to face the fact that the kinds of films they support domestically do little to challenge 
negative perceptions of the country internationally; they do little to generate soft power.  
 
Conclusion: the conflict bHWZHHQµaWWUDFWLRQ¶RIsoft pRZHUDQGµcHQVRUVKLS¶ 
 
This article has reviewed &KLQD¶VVW\OHRIILOPUHJXODWLRQLQWKHFRQWH[WRISURPRWLQJ&KLQHVH
film abroad, as well as analysing the changing relationship between the Chinese government 
and the national film industry, from the establishment of PRC in 1949 to the present. This has 
highlighted the fact that the government of China has attempted to formulate its film policy in 
response to the development of Chinese society and its film industry on the one hand. On the 
other hand, the CPC has sought to strengthen its legitimacy to rule and successfully transformed 
itself into µQRWRQO\>«@ helmsman of economic development, but also >«@ the tycoon of the 
cultural industry¶ (Brady 2009: 201-02). 
 
The Chinese film industry has been transformed from a highly centralised industry to a hybrid 
industry: operating under both party ideology and market demands within a strictly regulated 
governance framework. The Party has managed to strengthen competition within the Chinese 
film industry in the domestic market whilst still maintaining a tight grip on culture generally 
and the film industry specifically. In contrast with other national models for facilitating cultural 
industries, evidence has demonstrated that China is a typical µEngineer State¶ (Bell and Oakley 
2015: 116) in that it employs a censorship mechanism.  
 
Furthermore, based on the available evidence, I also argue that although China itself and its 
film industry have undergone many reforms and developed progressively, the state still 
fundamentally regards film as an instrument of ideology and controls it tightly by means of a 
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complex censorship mechanism with the aim of achieving its political agenda. It is also clear 
that, although the government has opened a space for non-state actors to participate in the film 
industry, findings suggest that the Beijing authorities still privilege SOEs over non-SOEs in 
this sector.  
 
Finally, this article explored the role of film in the so-called µGoing-Out Policy¶ and how this 
UHODWHVWR&KLQD¶VVRIWSRZHUDPELWLRQV. This policy is in line with the historical trajectory of 
WKHVWDWH¶Vfilm policy. The core issue is that all Chinese films exported overseas need to gain 
prior approval by the government. This leads to a tension EHWZHHQ&KLQD¶VGRPHVWLFSROLWLFDO
ideology, enforced by censorship, and its credibility on the international stage. In the process, 
it seems there is limited room for film genuinely to proPRWH&KLQD¶VVRIWSRZHU 
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